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Abstract  
There is an increasing prevalence of Web software that collects end-user information and transmits it to a remote 
server destination.  This information collecting software paradigm spans many scenarios – from fully legitimate 
software updates, to identifying user surfing habits (i.e. adware), to collecting personal user-information (i.e. 
spyware).  The design science research within this paper describes an information security management 
framework that extends existing code-signing conventions via an extended X.509.3 digital certificate specifying: 
(1) whether the signed software transmits any information from the end-user machine to any remote destination, 
and if so (2) a concise summary of the type of this information and the remote destination address(es).  This 
extended code-signing is then supported by the end-user’s operating system authentication of each outgoing Web 
transmission from each specific host-based software application.  The framework facilitates improved end-user 
management and regulatory governance of all Web communication streams emanating from the user host 
computer.  
Keywords  
 Information, security, management, privacy, risk. 
INTRODUCTION 
Internet technologies have revolutionized user-information collection across computer networks.  The paradigm 
of user-information collecting software spans many functional scenarios ranging from the clearly legitimate (e.g. 
application software updates), to the ethically concerning (e.g. identifying user Web surfing habits), through to 
the illicit collection of personal user-information.  The terms “spyware” and “adware” both describe software 
that collects user information – the key difference centres upon the type of user information collected (Gordon 
2005).  Spyware may log user key strokes (Hu et al 2005), or capture user email, instant messaging, passwords, 
and credit card information (Gordon 2005) – it is designed to illicitly collect and distribute user information 
(Cohen 2003).  Adware is considered a benign subset of spyware – delivering targeted pop-up advertisements to 
the user’s computer based on the analysis of that user’s Web surfing habits.  Adware may pose the security risk 
of privacy violation.  Spyware poses the security risk of identity and information theft (Gibson 2005).     
Spyware has proliferated with the increasing popularity of Web technologies (Fang et al 2005).  Cosgrove (2003) 
described how over 7000 different forms of spyware had been estimated to be running on U.S. based corporate 
and personal computers.  The U.S. marketing sector reported in Economist (2004) that software from the top 
three spyware firms in the U.S. was installed on approximately 100 million PCs.  A survey of home PC users 
conducted by America Online found spyware present on 80% of home PCs, whilst approximately 90% of those 
users with spyware were unaware of the spyware’s presence or purpose (Roberts 2004).  An audit of over 4.6 
million U.S. home PCs (Earthlink 2005) found 116.5 million instances of spyware infestation – with an average 
of 25 infestations per PC.  Spyware proliferation across the corporate sector was indicated in (FBI 2005) where 
79.5% of surveyed businesses reported a spyware security incident.  The SANS Institute in FBI (2005) reported a 
183% increase in websites that harboured spyware.  This situation was very much negatively impacting users’ 
confidence in online security, and therefore users’ confidence in online business.  
Spyware control has been problematic primarily because, unlike the universally distained criminal act of virus 
infection (Hu et al 2005), spyware distribution in general is a commercial venture and is difficult to distinguish 
from the many other forms of legitimate information-collecting software.  Indeed the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission stated in Federal Trade Commission (2005). “It is difficult to define spyware with precision.  The 
working definition proposed ... was software that aids in gathering information about a person or organization 
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without their knowledge and which may send such information to another entity without the consumer’s consent, 
or asserts control over a computer without the consumer’s knowledge.”  The literature review conducted with 
this research confirms that U.S. legislators have repeatedly failed to pass bills in the Congress because of the risk 
of restricting existing or impeding future Internet business strategies.  Spyware distributing businesses have 
routinely threatened legal action against the authors of any tools that label spyware for what it truly is (Edelman 
2006).  Sipior (2005) reported that the market for anti-spyware software was still small (between USD10-15 
million in sales) compared to the anti-virus industry (USD2.2 billion).  Even the general public seems to be 
confused with respect to spyware differentiation and attitude.  Clyman (2004) reported that “When most people 
hear the word ‘spyware’, they think in terms of malevolent software ...”  However Stafford (2004) reported that 
many users accepted spyware as a fair price to pay for getting free software and were very much reluctant to 
implement blocking/scanning procedures that risked upsetting this ‘win-win’ arrangement.   
The research question underpinning this paper is how to security manage user-information collecting software to 
prevent the unauthorized disclosure (i.e. breach confidentiality) of user information.  This paper describes design 
science research that has produced a security management framework for all user-information 
collecting/reporting Web based software.  The security framework, at its core, extends the existing code-signing 
public key infrastructure (PKI) to require each user-information collecting application to nominate at installation 
what user information is collected and transmitted to remote server destinations.  Additionally the framework 
then requires each user-information collecting application to authenticate (with the host operating system) each 
outgoing Web session initiated by that software application.  This framework facilitates the user-management of 
all Web communication streams emanating from the host, and this in turn supports the identification and control 
of software that engages in the deceptive, misleading, and fraudulent practices already proscribed in existing 
technology-focused legislation.  The framework is economically feasible because it does not add financial costs 
to the production of software – no additional certificates or software signing is required.  The framework is as 
secure from attack as any other component of a trusted computing base (i.e. operating system).  The remaining 
sections of this paper will unfold as follows.  Section two will describe the research methodology.  Section three 
will describe the threats model and risk analysis (derived for the existing security controls relating to user-
information collecting software) that fundamentally influenced the design of our new security framework.   
Section four will present the logical description of our security framework.   Section five will conclude the paper. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This paper describes design science IS research, the dominating IS research paradigm in the German-speaking 
countries and also heavily used in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Italy, and France (Winter, 2008).  While 
behavioural IS research aims at the exploration and validation of generic cause-effect relations, IS design science 
research aims at ‘utility’, i.e. at the construction and evaluation of generic means-ends relations.  That is, design 
science IS research aims at the construction of ‘better’ IS-related problem solutions (Winter, 2008).   
Design science IS research and behavioural IS research both aim for what has been called the ‘Pasteur quadrant’– 
combining a high standard of relevance with the highest standards of rigour (Winter, 2007).  The relevance of the 
research in this paper has already been described in the opening section (i.e. the increasing popularity and high 
risk profile of user-information gathering software).  The rigour of the research in this paper is more challenging 
to demonstrate simply because the rigour of generalized design science IS research “is less well defined and less 
commonly accepted than its behavioural counterpart.” (Winter, 2008, p. 470).  This lack of definition is perhaps 
best illustrated by the lack of a commonly accepted reference process model for design science IS research – with 
proposals including “build-evaluate-theorize-justify’ (March and Smith, 1995) and ‘develop/build – 
justify/evaluate’ (Hevner et al., 2004).  Consequently, this paper must demonstrate research rigour by an 
appropriate discussion of the research process model at its core.  This research process model is based on the 
fundamental IS security process – risk management (Oppliger, 2007). 
According to Oppliger (2007) and Stoneburner et al. (2002) risk management fundamentally drives IS security via 
a structured process of identifying, controlling, and eliminating or minimizing uncertain events that may affect 
system resources/assets.  Risk management requires a clear understanding of the targeted resources/assets, the 
threats to those resources/assets, and what attack strategies are likely to be used in relation to those 
resources/assets (Oppliger, 2007).  Consequently risk management provides an ideal template upon which to base 
the research process model used within this research.  Figure 1 logically presents our five sequential stage 
research process model, adapted from Oppliger (2007) and Stoneburner et al. (2002) and now discussed. 
• Security Policy (stage 1): This is a strategic, highly abstracted 2-tuple of: (1) the system resource(s) of 
value, and (2) the level of security that must be maintained with respect to this resource.  For this 
research this 2-tuple is: {user-information; prevention of the unauthorized disclosure, i.e. 
confidentiality}.  Security policy (stage 1) represents the research question underpinning this paper.  
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Figure 1: Research Process Model 
• Threat Model and Risk Analysis (stage 2): Threat model describes the likely operational strategies of all 
possible threat sources.   Risk analysis quantifies the success likelihood of an attack strategy against the 
identified system resource(s) within the context of deployed security strategies and security architectures.  
Success likelihood within this research is the well accepted taxonomy used in (Stoneburner et al. 2002), 
and described in Table 1.  
Table 1.  Success Likelihood of Attack Strategy 
Likelihood Level Definition 
High The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and 
controls to prevent the vulnerability from being exercised are ineffective. 
Medium The threat-source is motivated and capable, but controls are in place that 
may impede successful exercise of the vulnerability. 
Low The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place 
to prevent, or at least significantly impede, the vulnerability from being 
exercised. 
 
• Security Strategy (stage 3): The strategic description of the security controls that will be deployed in 
offsetting (mitigating) the threats identified at stage 2.  Security strategies within this research are the 
well accepted criteria used in (Stoneburner et al. 2002), and described in Table 2. 
  Table 2.  Security Strategies 
Security Strategy Definition 
Confidentiality The protection of information from unauthorized disclosure. 
Integrity The protection of information from improper modification.  The 
operational correctness of software processes. 
Authentication The verification of identity.   
 
• Security Architecture (stage 4): The implementation of the operational security controls to achieve the 
strategies described in stage 3.  Operational implementation possibilities are far too numerous to 
completely list – however each architecture implements directly one (or more) of the security strategies 
of stage 3 – for example, encryption controls implements confidentiality, digital signatures implement 
authentication, and hash digests implement integrity. 
• Residual Risk Evaluation (stage 5): Residual risk is the risk remaining after the derivation of a security 
strategy and the application of security architecture.  The calculation of residual risk then poses a security 
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gap assessment – does the residual risk level match (or better) the risk level that is desired by the security 
policy?  If not, steps 2 to 5 inclusive are repeated until the desired risk level is reached. 
The research process model of Figure 1 has been used in this research to calculate the residual risk level posed by 
user-information collecting software within the context of existing security strategies and architectures.  The 
results of this exercise will now be presented in the next section Threats Model and Risk Analysis.  The theory 
building component of Figure 1 (stages 2 to 5 inclusive) has been used in this research to derive a new security 
framework to further reduce the residual risk level posed by user-information collecting software.  This new 
security framework will be logically described in the section Framework.     
THREATS MODEL AND RISK ANALYSIS 
The threats model constructed within this research has focused on analysing and understanding those data 
transmissions emanating from host machines running user-information collection software.  Consequently our 
threats model will be discussed under the minor heading of Data Transmission Analysis.  The risk analysis within 
this research will be discussed under the minor headings: Success Likelihood of Illicit Information Collection. 
Data Transmission Analysis 
Data transmissions (frequently referred to as extrusions in the research literature) from the target software group 
are clearly considered, within the research security community, to be the major security threat posed by spyware 
(remembering the two major concerns contained within the Federal Trade Commission (2005) definition: “The 
working definition proposed ... was software that aids in gathering information about a person or organization 
without their knowledge and which may send such information to another entity without the consumer’s consent, 
or asserts control over a computer without the consumer’s knowledge.”)  Our threats model required the 
construction of purpose built software residing on a host machine and collecting/analysing a large set of (1) 
spyware request transmissions/extrusions and (2) the request transmissions of legitimate data collection 
programs.   
The analysis and understanding of the collected data extrusions were then performed with the goal of identifying 
any patterns that may differentiate spyware extrusions from the extrusions of legitimate data collection software.  
The analysis criteria (Table 3) comprised four {remote server address consistency, request frequency, request 
size, request periodicity} developed for the Web Tap utility (Cui et al. 2005) together with two developed within 
this research {user-agent name and sending protocol, request encryption}.  The anatomy of the software 
constructed for this purpose comprised the three logical auditing components specified in Bishop (2003): a 
logging engine; an analysis engine; and a notifier engine.  The logging engine essentially comprises a WinPcap 
software module that facilitates the packet imaging/copying of outgoing/egress communications.  This approach 
is very similar to that used in established software utilities such as tcpdump and ethereal/wireshark.  The notifier 
engine is essentially a reporting module.  The analysis engine assesses all transmissions on the basis of:  user-
agent-name (i.e. application name), remote server address details, request periodicity, request frequency, and 
request encryption.  This software was deployed for a continuous 30 day period on a test host machine – operated 
on a dedicated network behind a packet filtering firewall – and loaded with a selection of 40 spyware/adware 
agents and 10 professional applications utilizing data-reporting agents.   The analysis of the resulting 
transmissions produced the results described in Table 3.   
Table 3: Outgoing Transmission Analysis (Spyware and Legitimate Programs) 
Analysis 
Criteria Analysis Summary 
User-Agent 
Name and 
Sending 
Protocol 
All transmission used HTTP/TCP Therefore User-Agent field appears in HTTP 
requests and is used to name the client initiating the HTTP session.  Web browsers 
have distinctive User-Agent fields identifying the browser type/version (e.g., 
Mozilla/4.0) and client operating system (e.g., Windows NT 5.1; SV1).  71% of the 
studied spyware transmissions displayed a User-Agent field quite distinct from the 
User-Agent field known to be running on the host machine.  Most spyware displayed 
the User-Agent name of mainstream browser agents.   Only 6% of studied valid 
transmissions contained a User-Agent name not related to the application. 
Remote 
server 
address 
consistency 
All legitimate transmissions and 38% of spyware transmissions contacted a consistent, 
single remote server. 62% of spyware transmissions contacted a set of remote servers 
(up to a maximum of 8).  
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Request 
periodicity 
The HTTP content and capture/copied time are logged for each studied spyware 
communication.  Approximately 58% of the studied spyware transmissions and 77% 
of legitimate transmissions revealed a request periodicity.  That is, the transmitting 
software was initiating HTTP connections at defined time intervals.   The actual time 
intervals defining this periodicity varied greatly. 
Request 
frequency 
This criterion is closely linked with request periodicity.  All studied spyware initiated 
multiple HTTP sessions with remote servers within a 12 hour period.  The average 
frequency of contact was 7 sessions within the 12 hour period. 
Request size Most studied spyware packets were not large.  Of the total sample only 58 requests 
exceeded 2KB, whilst only 7 requests exceeded 5KB. 
Request 
encryption 
A measure of the entropy/frequency distribution of the data contained within requests.  
Complicated by routine character encoding schemes.  Encryption considered probable 
in approximately 7% of spyware transmissions and zero percent of legitimate 
transmissions. 
Analysis of the data summarized in Table 3 reveals several probable indicators for identifying spyware request 
transmissions.  This is consistent with the results presented and used (Cui et al 2005) to filter probable spyware 
extrusions (i.e. the Web Tap utility).  However the analysis within this research suggested these probabilities were 
not strong and furthermore the operational characteristics producing these probabilities could easily be changed 
by spyware authors to avoid detection.  The most compelling observation arising from the analysis was that all 
transmissions (spyware and legitimate) used the protocol suite HTTP/TCP.  In relation to spyware, this endorses 
the view of Borders et al. (2004): “Often, the only two ways out of a network are through a mail server and 
through a proxy (web) server.  Since e-mail is often more closely logged and filtered, the hacker may find 
outbound HTTP transactions to the best avenue for communication with a compromised workstation.”   In 
relation to legitimate software transmissions, it endorses the view that the vast majority of networks run the Web 
(i.e. allowing Web traffic to pass through firewalls etc), and therefore HTTP/TCP is the protocol suite of choice 
for Internet communicating software.  This poses the major problem in detecting spyware transmissions: the 
transmissions blend in anonymously with all legitimate HTTP traffic initiated by user Web activity and other 
legitimate Web communicating applications communicating with remote servers.  Often it is only possible to 
avoid this issue by not running HTTP and this is not workable in most situations.  HTTP should not be shut down 
– a better strategy is to remove the anonymity.  This is a key finding to take forward in developing a new 
framework. 
Success Likelihood of Illicit Information Collections 
The success likelihood of illicit information collections directly depends on the effectiveness of existing security 
architectures in managing user-information collecting software.  The literature survey conducted within this 
research suggests security architectures comprise three logical groupings: (1) filtering software, (2) legislative 
controls, and (3) code-signing.     
Filtering software controls comprise utilities such as firewalls, proxies, and desk-top or server based filtering 
applications.  In the main, filtering software controls have largely followed the existing mature anti-virus model 
(Gibson 2005) which comprises the following categories:    Filtering software controls exhibit one or more of the 
following function capabilities:   
• Media filtering: The automatic inspection of all incoming and outgoing communications for associated 
media type (e.g. text, audio, video) and the identification of malicious content via code signature 
scanning and anti-tampering integrity check. 
• Function scanning: The application of heuristics that attempt to establish the functional capabilities of 
the content. 
• Attack method detection: The application of heuristics that attempt to identify code that displays known 
attack methods. 
The effectiveness of filtering software is reflected in Weis (2005): “So far, none of the anti-spyware packages 
have proven to be 100% effective”.  This is largely because filtering software (whether virus or spyware oriented) 
can only detect that software for which signature patterns have already been identified and extracted.  This is 
always a ‘catch-up’ challenge in the anti-virus industry – an industry where virus classification is very clear cut.  
It is even more problematic in the anti-spyware industry where the classification of spyware is quite fuzzy.  In 
these circumstances, the success likelihood of illicit information collection within a context of filtering software 
architecture must be rated (by Table 1) as MEDIUM.  
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Legislative control proposals for the specific management of spyware have been quite frequent in the U.S. – but 
not in Europe or Australia.  Table 4 below has been produced within this research and summaries the spyware-
specific proposed legislation (i.e. bills with the U.S. Congress).     
Table 4.  Proposed U.S. Spyware Bills 
Bill Name History/Result 
Spyware Control and Privacy 
Protection Act of 2000 
Introduced S.3180 6th Oct 2000.  Never voted on by Senate. 
Computer Software Privacy and 
Control Act of 2004   
Introduced H. R.4255 30th April 2004.  Never voted on by 
Senate 
Internet Spyware (I-SPY) 
Prevention Act of 
2004/2005/2007 
Introduced H.R. 4661 23rd June 2004. 
Re-introduced H.R. 744 10th Feb. 2005. 
Re-introduced H.R. 1525 14th Mar. 2007.  Each bill passed 
Reps.  No bill ever voted on by Senate. 
Software Principles Yielding 
Better Levels of Consumer 
Knowledge Act (or SPY BLOCK 
Act) of 2004 / 2005 
Introduced S.2145 27th Feb. 2004. 
Re-introduced S.687 20th Mar. 2005.  Neither bill voted on by 
Senate. 
Enhanced Consumer Protection 
Against Spyware Act of 2005   
Introduced S.1004 11th May 2005.  Never voted on by Senate. 
Securely Protect Yourself Against 
Cyber Trespass Act (SPY Act) of 
2003/2005/2007 
Introduced H.R.2929 25th May 2003. 
Re-introduced H.R.29 2nd Jan. 2005. 
Re-introduced H.R.964 8th Feb 2007.  Each bill passed Reps.  
No bill ever voted on by Senate. 
Undertaking Spam, Spyware, and 
Fraud Enforcement with 
Enforcers beyond Borders Act of 
2006 
Introduced S.1608 29th Jul. 2005.  Passed by Senate and Reps.  
Became law on 22nd Dec. 2006. 
Counter Spy Act (2007)    Introduced S.1625.  Never voted on by Senate. 
Informed P2P User Act 
(2008/2009) 
Introduced H.R.7176 27th Sept. 2008 
Re-introduced H.R.5th Mar. 2009.  First bill never voted on by 
Reps.  Second bill passed Reps.  Yet to be voted on by Senate 
(111th Congress concludes end of 2010). 
 
Analysis of the legislative controls specifically proposed to manage spyware (from 2000 to date) reveals that only 
one bill (of the nine proposed) has become law, and that bill focused specifically (and only) on extending the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act to (1) include a focus on foreign commerce “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices” and (2) authorized the FTC to liaise with foreign law enforcement agencies.  Only three bills were 
considered by the full Congress.  One bill is still live and has until December 2010) to pass – although this bill 
(Informed P2P User Act) is very narrow in its focus.  Indeed most bills were never reported out of committee and 
never voted upon.  The Congress records associated with these unsuccessful bills all contain two consistent 
criticisms:  
• The specific definitions within the bills (e.g. of computer software and information collection programs) 
would extend far beyond spyware and cover generic Internet and Web technologies.  Consequently the bills 
risked a blanket prohibition of existing and emerging technology (with some exceptions attempted within 
certain bills).  This approach would restrict existing – and impede future – business practices. 
• The FTC (in hearings associated with several bills) testified that it would welcome the additional power to 
seek civil penalties from those who break the law (i.e. the FTC Act).   The FTC testified that its authority to 
prosecute ‘deceptive, misleading, and fraudulent’ activity was adequate from an enforcement viewpoint.  It 
conceded, however, that it had prosecuted only 7 cases over a 10 year period.   
In these circumstances, the success likelihood of illicit information collection within a context of specific anti-
spyware legislation must be rated (by Table 1) as HIGH.  
Code signing is conceptually described (Rubin et al. 1998) as client management of a list of entities that the 
client trusts.  When mobile code is received by the client (e.g. via the Web), the client verifies that the received 
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code is signed by an entity on the list.  If so, the code is run.  Code signing (Mansfield-Devine 2009) is 
operationally described as a simple process in which the software vendor creates a hash (via an algorithm such as 
SHA or MD5) of the code file for distribution.  The hash is then signed using the private key of a public-private 
key pair (i.e. via public key cryptography).  The vendor’s public key is itself signed by a Certificate Authority 
(CA), an entity we all trust within an overall Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  The vendor’s public key is placed 
by the CA within a strongly authenticated digital certificate.  The vendor then distributes the code, together with 
the signed hash of the code file and the CA-authenticated digital certificate in an area of the code file known as 
the signature block.  The end-user will then verify the vendor’s digital certificate, which in turn allows the end-
user to verify the signed hash of the code file – and thereby authenticating that the code file has not been altered 
since it was prepared and signed by the vendor.  Code signing is described as the basis for a stronger trust 
relationship between vendors and end-users (Mansfield-Devine 2009).  Code signing is the basis for Microsoft’s 
Authenticode framework. Code signing adoption is gaining in momentum and it is widely seen within the 
industry and by users as enhancing trust and progressing the goal of digital rights management.  Criticisms have 
surfaced, however, in two areas (Mansfield-Devine 2009): (1) lack of consistency in standards across Certificate 
Authorities, and (2) the lack of specificity resulting from the issue of a single code signing certificate to a specific 
vendor (i.e. “Giving someone a code signing certificate allows them to digitally sign anything that they have”).  
The criteria for commercial certification is also very generalized and quite weak – comprising (1) proof of 
identity; (2) a pledge by the applicant that the distributed code will not contain viruses; and (3) a level of 
financial standing indicated by a Dun & Bradstreet rating of corporate financial stability.    
In these circumstances, the success likelihood of illicit information collection within a context of code signing 
must be rated (by Table 1) as HIGH.   
FRAMEWORK 
The three principal factors emerging from the previous section were: (1) Spyware data streams (i.e. extrusions) 
are anonymously mixed with all other legitimate Web traffic and are very difficult to consistently pick from 
legitimate Web software extrusions; (2) Spyware activity must be recognized as deceptive, misleading, or 
fraudulent because of what the software does – not the technology it uses; and (3) The existing code signing 
model does not provide any real control or specificity as to the information type and information legitimacy 
transmitted by signed software.  The overall success likelihood of illicit information collection within this overall 
security architecture must be rated (by Table 1) as MEDIUM.  An improved security management framework is 
now abstractly described in Figure 2 and logically discussed in the following paragraphs.  It is suggested that this 
framework reduces the success likelihood of illicit information collection down to LOW.   
 
Figure 2.  Security Framework 
In overview, the new framework comprises a Public Key Infrastructure for all Web communicating software.  A 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is described (Whitman et al 2009) as: “an integrated system of software, 
encryption methodologies, protocols, legal agreements, and third-party services that enables users to 
communicate securely.”  The digital certificate is a central component within a PKI.  The conclusion reached in 
1. Installation – an extended X.509.v3 certificate is required by user-agent application.  This 
certificate relates to the code-signing of the application software. This certificate is submitted to 
and stored by host OS in secure area.  Successful installation produces a secure association 
between the user-agent application and the host operating system. 
 
3. Ongoing user-management of user-agent applications: 
• Provides user on request with names and installation details of all user-agent applications 
running on host. 
• Provides user on request with details of user-agent transmission activities. 
• Facilitates uninstall of any user-agent application. 
 
Host 
Machine 
2. HTTP request transmission initiated by user-agent 
application: 
• User-agent request header is completed in plain text and with 
an authentication token of the user-agent. 
• Operating system identifies user-agent via the retrieval of its 
relevant digital certificate, and validates (or disqualifies) the 
request transmission 
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this research is that the relative anonymity applicable to all outgoing Web traffic from a host machine must be 
removed and the user provided with the clear capacity to more effectively identify and manage that outgoing 
Web traffic.  An effective way to remove anonymity within a system is to name and authenticate each entity 
within that system.  Digital certificates and an overall PKI facilitate naming and authentication.  In this sense it is 
suggested that this security framework builds upon the concept of code signing widely used for the trusted 
distribution of executable content (e.g. Microsoft’s Authenticode).  The security framework is now described 
with respect to Figure 2. 
The security framework allows three primary activities: Installation (a one-time activity), Request Transmission 
(a repeated activity), and User-Management (a repeated activity).   Within this framework, a Web 
communicating application is called a user-agent application. 
 Installation:  The user-agent application must possess one X.509.v3 digital certificate (code signing certificate) 
with obligatory X.509.v3 extensions as described in Table 5. 
Table 5.  New Framework Certificate Extensions 
Extension Name Extension Definition 
Application_Name The unique name of the specific software application – within the name 
space of the software vendor. 
Information_Type Defined as USER, or APPLICATION, or OTHER.  The classification 
of information collected and transmitted by software application. 
Destination_URL The IP address to where the Information_Type is sent by 
Application_Name.   
This extended code-signing certificate has been issued to – and owned by - the publisher of the software (i.e. the 
software vendor/distributor).  The extensions in Table 5 are obligatory and convey additional subject 
identification information and policy information allowed for in Housley et al. (1999). 
• The certificate is presented to the host operating system at installation (i.e. the installation package 
contains the user-agent code set, the signed hash of the code set, and the extended code signing 
certificate).  This is very much as per existing code signing schemes (e.g. Microsoft’s Authenticode).  
The conventional ‘Subject_Name’ field of this code signing certificate may still list the corporate owner 
of the certificate.  The extended field ‘Application_Name’ will name the specific user-agent application.  
This is contrasted with a conventional code signing certificate which authenticates and names the 
software publisher only.   Following successful installation, the host operating system has created a 
secure association with the installed software application – we shall call this (secure_association)
 
user_agent.  This secure association is temporally persistent and will be used to authenticate the software 
application on each occasion it initiates an outwardly directed Web communication session.  
Request-transmission: This activity comprises three sequential actions: (1) the request by the user-agent 
application of a symmetric session key from the host operating system, (2) preparation of the Web request by the 
user-agent application and (3) the authentication and transmission/non-transmission of this Web request by the 
host operating system.   
• The user-agent application requests a symmetric session key from the host operating system.  This 
request is decided by the host operating system on the basis of the (secure_association)
 user_agent created 
at installation between the user-agent and the host operating system.  If granted, this symmetric session 
key will be known as (sym_session_key)
 user_agent.  This key will exist and be used by the user-agent 
during the life of the forthcoming HTTP communication session.  This key will be added to, and stored 
(for the duration of this Web session) within the applicable (secure_association)
 user_agent.  The session 
key will be destroy and not reused again when this HTTP session is terminated. 
 
   
• The user-agent application prepares a Web request for transmission by the TCP within the host 
operating system.  The HTTP request-header fields are constructed as outlined RFC 2616 (HTTP/1.1) 
– with one variation (the variation retains full compliance with RFC 2616): the user-agent request-
header field.  Within this security framework, the user-agent request-header field is used to name and 
authenticate each user-agent request transmission.  Within RFC 2616 the user-agent request header 
field is described as: “contains information about the user agent originating the request.  This is for 
statistical purposes, the tracing of protocol violations, and automated recognition of user agents for 
the sake of tailoring responses to avoid user agent limitations.  User agents SHOULD include this field 
with requests.”  The augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) used in RFC 2616, describes the user-agent 
request-header field as: User-Agent = “User-Agent” “:”*( product | comment).  An example would 
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be: User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows XP; SV1)    That is, the field can contain 
multiple product tokens and comments identifying the agent and any sub products.  In this framework, 
the user-agent request-header field will contain the agent details as currently required – concatenated 
with the following:  
[Application_Name+timestamp](sym_session_key)
 user_agent.   
That is, the Application_Name from the extended X.509v3 code-signing certificate - concatenated with 
the user-agent private key encrypted (Application_Name and timestamp).  The use of 
sym_session_key)
 user_agent  will demonstrates the authenticity of this Web transmitting application to the 
host operating system. 
•  The host operating system receives the Web request for transmission.  The operating system checks the 
user-agent request-header field and establishes the Application_Name of this user-agent application.   
The operating system, using this unencrypted Application_Name data (an implementation of the 
‘shared-secret’ security principle), retrieves the appropriate (sym_session_key)
 user_agent  user-agent 
digital certificate, and the public key (i.e. U-APub) within this certificate.  The operating system then 
decrypts (Application_Name+timestamp).  The decrypted Application_Name is compared with the 
name as stated in clear text by the user-agent.  The decrypted timestamp is validated against operating 
system clock time (to offset ‘replay’ attacks).  If all checks are passed, the authentication token (i.e. 
[Application_Name timestamp](sym_session_key)
 user_agent is removed by the operating system from the 
user-agent request-header field to ensure this data does not subsequently confuse remote servers.  The 
request is transmitted and details logged by the operating system.  If all checks are not passed, the host 
user is notified (via a security alert) and asked for adjudication.  The details are then logged by the 
operating system. 
User-management:  This activity is initiated at the request of the host machine user.  User-management provides 
the following reports: 
• Summarised historical listing of the transmissions made by all user-agent applications.  This listing 
provides the following information set: {process name, date installed, total number of transmissions, 
remote addresses contacted, type of information transmitted (i.e. USER, APPLICATION, or OTHER), 
and total bandwidth used}. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this research was to contribute to the effective security management of user-information collecting 
software (including spyware and adware).  Our research produced three important factors: (1) spyware extrusions 
are relatively anonymous within the overall set of Web transmissions leaving any host machine, (2) anti-spyware 
controls must help identify deceptive, misleading, and fraudulent behaviour, and (3) the existing code signing 
model could be extended to provide greater specificity and therefore security utility.  
The security framework described in this paper proposes a new and more comprehensive direction for software 
code signing.  The framework is economically feasible because it does not add financial costs to the production 
of software.  The framework, which is as secure from attack as any other component of a trusted computing base 
(i.e. operating system), directly aims to identify and authenticate Web request transmissions before they exit a 
host machine.  This removes the current anonymity under which spyware proliferates, and also moves some 
distance to discouraging the authoring and distribution of suspect software.  The security framework also 
provides a user with a much improved capacity to review the historical records of information transmissions from 
the host machine.  These reasons strongly indicate that the success likelihood of illicit information collection 
under this new framework must be rated (by Table 1) as LOW.   
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